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1914-1919
Abstract: It is generally asserted that corporate social reporting (CSR)
is a phenomenon of the late 20th century. The present paper contests
this view by looking at the ways in which British companies reacted
to the challenges they faced during the First World War, when they
were exposed to charges of profiteering, as well as to industrial unrest
and high taxation. The paper considers the use of the speeches made
by chairmen at annual general meetings to refute these charges and
defend themselves. It considers the relevance of these findings for
contemporary social reporting, and suggests that investigation of the
history of CSR is likely to show further examples of its use by compa-
nies to put forward “the business case”.
INTRODUCTION
A wide array of modes of corporate reporting is currently
deployed by large companies worldwide in a variety of media –
in newspapers, and magazines, in dedicated reports, on the
Web, on video. They run the spectrum from heavily regulated
disclosures in the form of audited financial statements to what
has been described as “advocacy advertising”1 [Sethi, 1977;
Milne, 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002]. Somewhere in between
fall a variety of reports on corporate social responsibility, envi-
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ronmental performance, contribution to employee well-being
and so on, containing varying proportions of quantified, audited
statements, narrative, diagrams and pictures. Like the financial
reports, they are addressed to shareholders and to the public
and intended to convey information about the company’s perfor-
mance and prospects, but, unlike the financial reports, they are
voluntary and their content is not regulated.
The present paper examines an episode in the history of
corporate reporting – the extent and nature of the voluntary
disclosures made by limited companies in Great Britain during
the First World War and the beginning of readjustment immedi-
ately after the war. They are, it is suggested here, of some inter-
est for what they have to say about the relationship between
limited companies, their shareholders and society at large in
that period, and also about the role then and now of corporate
social reporting. The evidence offered here is potentially part of
a continuing history of corporate reporting, and one of the in-
tentions of the paper is to encourage further research to track
the extent to which companies – in Britain and elsewhere –
made disclosures of this kind both prior to and after the episode
outlined here.
The paper begins by outlining the role of the annual general
meeting (AGM) in the period under review, and the issues which
were of particular importance to limited companies during the
First World War. It goes on to review the treatment of these
issues in the speeches made by company chairmen and senior
directors at wartime AGMs, and considers the relationship be-
tween this form of communication and the role and content of
what is now known as corporate social reporting.
CORPORATE REPORTING – THE ROLE OF THE AGM
Britain in the mid-19th century has been described by
Cottrell [1980, p. 41] as having “the most permissive commercial
law in Europe”, and the Companies Acts of 1900 and 1907 did
little to impose restrictions. The amount of accounting disclo-
sure required in the early 20th century was minimal. Companies
had to produce an audited balance sheet, but the publication of
a profit and loss account (which did not have to be audited) was
not a requirement until the Companies Act of 1929, so the fig-
ures for sales and operating profit need not have been, and
generally were not, disclosed. To make the year’s position even
more opaque, companies had discretion over the amount of de-
preciation they charged, which tended to vary in response to the
2
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amount of profit they wanted to abate rather than the wear and
tear on assets, and they could also hide substantial amounts of
profit in provisions, e.g. for taxation, which melted into an un-
differentiated figure for current liabilities on the balance sheet.
Apart from the dividends that were paid out, there was little
hard information about the year’s financial performance, and
the fact that the current year’s dividends could be paid out of the
preceding years’ profits did not increase the clarity of the pic-
ture.2
There were complaints about this situation – from share-
holders and from Members of Parliament – from the late 19th
century onwards. One important counter from supporters of the
permissive status quo was to remind critics that limited compa-
nies in Britain were required to hold an annual general meeting.
At the AGM, which all voting shareholders could attend, the
directors were required to make a statement about the
company’s financial performance, obtain the shareholders’ ap-
proval of the dividend and the appointment of directors and
auditors, and answer questions about their stewardship of the
company’s assets. The limited company, it was frequently ar-
gued, was the product of a contract between directors and
shareholders; if shareholders were unhappy or curious, the
AGM was the forum in which they could exercise their rights as
individuals to the information and explanations which they
needed. It was therefore a key element of corporate governance,
the place where the deficiencies of the financial statements
could be made good. Britain did not need accounting disclosure
to be legally mandated, it was claimed, as shareholders had rem-
edies – they could sack the directors or sell their shares – if they
were not happy with the information they could obtain at the
AGM.
The AGM attracted press coverage on a greater scale than
do comparable events today. They were reported at length in
local newspapers; for instance the Sheffield Daily Independent
devoted half or three quarters of a broadsheet page to the AGMs
of large local companies such as Hadfields, John Brown or
Vickers. Often they were covered in national papers as well, and
in weekly journals – for instance companies could and did pay
2 It is of course still possible for a British company to pay dividends out of
previous years’ reserves – but the requirement to produce a detailed analysis of
reserve movements means that it is now possible for the reader of the accounts
to be aware that this has happened. If reserve movements are not charted,
dividends are the only indication of profitability available, and may not be a safe
guide to current profits.
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to have their AGM reported in The Economist. The Times re-
ported AGMs more or less daily. They were of interest because
of their potential to disclose information about the company
which could not be deduced from the financial statements them-
selves – a major part of the company’s attempt to present itself
to the world.
The present paper examines the role of the AGM during the
First World War, a period when British companies were exposed
to a series of problems and criticisms that were largely new to
them. In Cronin’s words, “the impact of the war upon workers,
employers and the state was extremely contradictory” [Cronin,
1991, p. 67]. This contradiction set up tensions which were ex-
pressed in many ways by the parties involved – for instance by
strike action, political campaigning, and legislation. The follow-
ing sections of this paper outline some of these tensions as they
affected businesses, before looking at their expression via the
AGM.
THE ISSUES FOR BUSINESS, 1914-1919
E.M.H. Lloyd, who worked in the Ministry of Food during
the war, said that there were two phrases that were repeated
“many hundreds of times” by his colleagues: “Every private in-
terest must be subordinated to the successful prosecution of the
war” and “There must be as little interference as possible with
the normal channels of trade” [Lloyd, 1924, p. 259]. There is a
tension between the two slogans, which is apparent in the issues
that preoccupied companies during the war.
The same dichotomy is more forcefully suggested by two
cartoons which appeared in the issue of Punch dated 5 April
1916. A full-page cartoon [p. 233] depicted a bleak hillside with
a gallows, the noose swinging in stormy wind. The caption read
“FOR TRAITORS” and below “A WARNING TO PROMOTERS
OF STRIKES IN WAR-TIME”. On p. 235, a half-page cartoon
showed a slightly shabby middle-class man and woman on a
London street, peering at a large chauffeur-driven car with an
elegantly-dressed couple in the back. The caption read:
“She ‘Good gracious! The Brown-Smiths!! I thought
they were so poor’.
He ‘Yes. But, you see, he’s been supplying the Govern-
ment with shells for quite a fortnight!’”
The conflict between private interests – of workers, employ-
ers and shareholders – and the interest of the government en-
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gaged feelings at various levels. There was a desire on all sides
to be seen as serving the national interest and a readily-deployed
sense of public indignation if any of the parties involved ap-
peared to be putting its own welfare first. But there was also a
strong sense among those contributing to the war effort that
national service should not be used as an excuse for exploita-
tion. The present paper will explore one aspect of this conflict –
the need for limited companies to report wartime profitability
whilst avoiding the stigma of exploitation, and the use of report-
ing at the AGM in reconciling the two objectives.
Some wartime AGMs did not address this issue – the direc-
tors briefly announced the dividend, presided over the votes,
and then adjourned for lunch or tea. Shareholders often had
little or nothing to say beyond approving the dividend and the
reappointment of the directors. But newspaper and journal re-
ports show that there were also numerous AGMs which were, if
not a forum for debate, at least a platform for the directors to
express their views and make their case on a wide range of
topics. The following section of the paper identifies the main
areas of controversy in wartime, before the nature of the corpo-
rate response to them is discussed.
Four issues appear to have been of particular concern for
business during the War. These were the impact of government
controls, the altered basis of taxation of profits, the relationship
between employers and labor, and the negative public percep-
tion of business behavior, summarized in the charge of “profi-
teering” that was leveled for much of the War. Cronin [1991, p.
68] identifies “a decisive reorientation in the relationship be-
tween businesses and the state”, and the more important ele-
ments of this reorientation are now described.
Government Intervention: One of the major changes brought
about by the war was the advancing tide – albeit unevenly ad-
vancing – of government intervention and regulation. In 1915
there were 27 government committees dealing with issues of
trade, industry and finance, by 1918 there were 107 [Hewins
Archive, 95/2/2 and 95/2/15]. In munitions, the government
directed 3.4 million workers, either directly or in controlled
privately–owned establishments. The coal mines were virtually
nationalized after 1917. The government set both prices and
wages. By the end of the war it had “direct charge of shipping,
railways and canal transport: it purchased about 90% of the
imports and marketed over 80% of the food consumed at home”
[Pollard, 1983, p. 22]. All these changes happened piecemeal, in
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response to perceived needs, rather than as part of a grand strat-
egy by the British government, but they were unprecedented in
the way they interfered with the autonomy of limited compa-
nies.
Taxation: Prior to the war, there had been no tax on businesses,
as distinct from taxation of the individuals owning them. Lim-
ited companies acted as “holding agents” [Daunton, 1996, p.
898], deducting income tax from dividends, but were not in
themselves “taxable entities” [ibid]. The British government’s re-
sponse to the costs of war had two major effects on taxation.
The level of income tax exemption was reduced in 1915/16, lead-
ing to a massive increase in the number of taxpayers – from 1.2
million in 1913/14 to 3.5 million in 1918/19 [Daunton, 1996, p.
88]. Secondly, in 1915, Excess Profit Duty (EPD) was intro-
duced. This was a “hybrid” [Hicks et al., 1941, p. 7] in that
businesses could elect to be taxed either on the return on capital
employed in excess of a statutory rate (six per cent for compa-
nies) or on the excess of wartime profits over the average peace-
time profit for the three years preceding the war [Daunton,
2002, p. 56]. The rate of EPD rose in stages from 50 per cent
when it was introduced to 80 per cent in January 1917 [Hicks et
al., 1941, p. 78].
Labor Relations: Business agreement to the principle of EPD was
expressed in March 1915, during the Treasury Conference,
which was attended by government, trades union and employer
representatives. Lloyd George called for “an understanding with
regard to the limitation of profits” and “an understanding of
course that the works will be completely under the control of the
State” [History of the Ministry of Munitions Vol. II, 1922, p. 83].
In return, “the other side of the bargain” [ibid.] was agreement
by the trades unions that there would be no strikes and that
trades union working practice restrictions would be removed
during the war. The “bargain” was part of the Treasury Agree-
ment of 1915 that resulted from the Conference, but it was soon
reinforced in legislation – the 1915 Munitions of War Act. This
ratified the Treasury Agreement, and also required the ac-
ceptance by employees of dilution (opening skilled work to
unskilled men, women and boys) and of restrictions on over-
time.
Reactions to Change: A number of commentators have regarded
the “bargain” of 1915 as a victory for employers, such that
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Askwith, the government’s chief industrial negotiator, saw the
danger of its “appearing as the mouthpiece of the employers”
[quoted in Middlemas, 1979, p. 73]. The President of the Board
of Trade, Runciman, described the employers in March 1915 as
“not at all in a bad humour” [Wigley, 1976, p. 101]. The reason
for their alleged good mood was what Middlemas [1979, p. 73]
calls the government’s “curiously business-oriented sensitivity
on the question of profits”. The terms given to them were “gen-
erous” [Wigley, 1976, p. 101]; the choice of tax base meant that
companies making a low profit immediately before the war
could choose to be taxed on the excess return on capital em-
ployed rather than on the increased profit. Meanwhile, the
trades unions faced restrictions that “pleased no one” [Wigley,
1976, p. 101].
Certainly labor relations reflected workers’ unhappiness.
They were limited in their ability to take industrial action, and
to move from one job to another. Dilution created conflicts be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers, and employers and manag-
ers had acquired new powers. A series of major strikes reflected
this dissatisfaction – among others these took place in South
Wales and on Clydeside in 1915, in Sheffield and again on
Clydeside in 1916 and countrywide among engineering workers
in 1917. But there were other reasons for discontent. One, as
noted above, was the extension of income tax to working men
who had never previously fallen within its scope. The other was
more prevalent and therefore more significant: “The inflation of
food and other basic commodity prices (especially coal) was the
cause of a much more intense and widespread feeling of work-
ing-class ‘unfairness’” [Waites, 1987, p. 223].
According to the Ministry of Food, prices of principal foods
in July 1918 were more than twice their July 1914 level [Times,
25 November 1918]. The Commissioners charged with investi-
gating industrial unrest in North-East England concluded that
“food prices are the most general cause of unrest”, but they
noted that the sense of “actual hardship” was combined with
“the belief that prices are enhanced not only by scarcity but also
by profiteering” [quotation from their report in The Times, 1
August 1917]. This wider concern – indignation about profiteer-
ing- will be reviewed in the following section of the paper.
Profiteering: The belief that businesses were using shortages and
government demand to fix abnormally high prices was not con-
fined to those who suffered hardship because food was dear.
Nor was the accusation levied solely against food manufacturers
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and vendors. The accusers and their targets were far more wide-
spread.
Searle [1987, pp. 289-298] discusses the extent to which the
attack on profiteering was taken up by a variety of political
persuasions. Socialists, of course, saw it as an inevitable by-
product of capitalism. For traditionalist Tories, it represented
the decline of the aristocracy and the rise of a plutocracy – “the
hard-faced men who look as though they had done very well out
of the war” [Masterson, n.d., p. 140]. Liberals saw profiteers as
the enemy of the middle-class (like the shabby couple in the
Punch cartoon quoted above) and for right-wing Radicals, they
were traitors “playing the game of the Hun” [Searle, 1987, p.
293].3
The notion of profiteering was, therefore, one that drew
attention and hostility on all sides; the issue that gave more
scope for debate was that of its identification in business prac-
tice. This has attracted the attention of a number of historians.
Studies of business performance generally [Boswell and Johns,
1982], of shipping profits [Arnold, 1991; Napier, 1991; Arnold,
1997] and of armaments profits [Arnold, 1998] have made it
clear that by no means all businesses made unfair profits. Cer-
tainly shipping companies, for instance, did in some cases make
large profits, but the effect of wartime business was “highly
variable” [Arnold, 1991, p. 339] and must be set off against high
levels of commercial risk because of the danger of losing vessels
[ibid., p. 351; Napier, 1991, p. 330]. In addition, inflation had a
major effect; after adjusting for inflation, the profits of arma-
ments firms were in fact lower between 1915 and 1919 than
from 1910 to 1914, “an early and poorly acknowledged example
of money illusion” [Arnold, 1998, p. 314]. In a wide-ranging
survey, Boswell and Johns find that business behavior covered
the spectrum from blatant profiteering [Boswell and Johns,
1982, pp. 428, 431] to efforts to save the government’s money
[op.cit., p. 432].
There was, however, evidence that persuaded the contempo-
rary public that profiteering was going on. Overall, ordinary
dividends showed an increase.
3 As an illustration of Searle’s contention, see for instance The Times of 15
June 1917 which reported both an attack by the National Transport Workers’
Federation on “the unwillingness of shipping interests to make a fair deal”, and
also the claim of a committee of Unionist MPs to have “unmistakable evidence”
of profiteering “on the part of big firms as well as small”.
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These figures were an average which took account of some
drops in profitability (e.g. trams, gas supply), but it was the rise
in the average that could be used to support the claim that
wartime emergencies were being used to boost profits. And,
more specifically, there were individual companies that were
demonstrably making vastly increased profits. Spillers and Bak-
ers, the flour millers, increased their profits from £89,000 in
1913 to £368,000 in 1915. This was reported in Parliament and
led to angry protests:
Mr. T Healy (Cork, NE, Nat.) – What we want to know
is how long this gang will be allowed to sweat the faces
of the poor whilst the common people are giving their
blood for the country. (Cheers)
Mr. Crooks (Woolwich, Lab.) – When are the Govern-
ment Departments going to cease apologizing for rob-
bery? [Times, 30 April 1915].
Shipping profits attracted similar indignation. They were taken
at face value, ignoring the reservations suggested above by
Arnold and Napier. The Economist commented that “No busi-
ness has done better out of the war” [6 November 1915] and
Asquith called the behavior of shipping contractors “disgusting”
[Masterson, n.d., p. 143].
Claims of profiteering persisted throughout the war for a
number of reasons. There was indeed evidence that some busi-
TABLE 1
Ordinary Dividends of British Companies
July-June Average Ordinary
Dividend Rate (%)
08/09 6.3
09/10 6.8
10/11 8.0
11/12 8.7
12/13 9.7
13/14 10.4
14/15 9.1
15/16 10.4
16/17 10.2
17/18 10.5
18/19 11.0
Source: The Economist, July 1919 [quoted in Waites, 1987, p. 100].
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nesses were making unfair profits in their dealings with the
government and/or the public, as noted by Boswell and Johns.
Searle, however, comments that profiteering was not discussed
“within a strictly economic frame of reference”. It was perceived
that “something was happening which ‘offended public opinion
or damaged civilian morale’” [1987, p. 287, quoting Boswell and
Johns]. The combination of high prices, large dividends and
scandals such as Spillers created public sensitivity about busi-
ness profits in general. There was an anxiety that businesses
were transgressing moral limits and the public wanted political
intervention.
The result of the changes outlined above – in the relation-
ship of businesses with government, with workers and with the
public at large – was that companies needed to renegotiate and
redefine their position. They could not count on social accep-
tance; they needed to make the case for the way they carried on
their business. In addition, despite the claims noted above that
businessmen were largely happy with the settlement outlined by
the Treasury Agreement; it can be argued that not all the war-
time changes were satisfactory for them. Indeed, it will be sug-
gested below that many businessmen felt increasing concern
that their position was deteriorating, and that they needed to
ward off threats to their present security and future survival.
The following section of the paper outlines the corporate re-
sponse to wartime change, as it was expressed via the AGM.
CORPORATE RESPONSE
Companies found themselves in a significantly changed en-
vironment. Despite the claims quoted earlier that they had been
favorably treated, they were exposed to government intervention
and public criticism. Labor problems, although not as severe as
in the years immediately before the war, were still a threat.4 The
“widespread belief that businessmen were profiting tremen-
dously during the war and that government intervention consis-
tently favoured the interests of employers” [Cronin, 1991, p. 69]
meant that companies needed to protect their public image and
their interests. This section of the paper reviews the disclosures
made at AGMs in pursuit of this aim.
4 Employers’ inability to undertake wage bargaining could entail govern-
ment-imposed settlements in case of a dispute, and shop-stewards’ committees
had a growing influence in organising and representing workers [Middlemas,
1979, p. 113].
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More companies published their AGM reports than before –
between 1914 and 1919 the numbers who paid to have their
reports published in The Economist increased from fewer than
400 to well over 500.5 They used the platform provided by the
AGM to make voluntary disclosures in a variety of ways – partly
defensively, to protect and enhance their own image, but also
polemically, to attack their critics and those who seemed to be
threatening their position.
Contribution to the War Effort: The most popular defensive tactic
of companies was to enumerate the direct contributions they
were making to the war, in terms of the men who had left them
to join the army and the levels of casualties. By May 1915, the
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company (RMSP) reported that it had
more than 1,000 men in the forces [Times, 13 May 1915]. Shell
had 300 and announced to cheers at the 1915 AGM that it had
opened a rifle range in the head office basement “to give some
practice to those who have been unable to go to the front”
[Times, 23 June 1915]. The Chairman of Spillers read out the
names of the employees who had died on active service. His use
of this tactic was rather sardonically noted by The Economist:
“Directors set forth the number of employees already killed,
wounded or missing, as if the patriotism of their servants were a
set-off to the abnormal profits they are making out of ‘war
bread’” [1 May 1915, p. 851]. Many firms could also point out
the support they were giving to wives and families, for instance
by topping up ex-employees’ army pay to the level of standard
wages.6
Profiteering and EPD: The main area where companies felt the
need to defend themselves was the accusation of profiteering.
There were various strategies for countering this, and all were
deployed. One approach was selflessly to welcome EPD as a
necessary sacrifice in the national interest. Lord Inchcape, the
Chairman of P&O, declared in December 1915 that “no sacrifice
5 Stock Exchange restrictions on new issues in wartime make it likely that
the majority of these additional reports were placed by existing, rather than by
new, companies.
6 For other examples of this theme, see, among others, Sutherland Steam-
ship Co [Times, 6 May 1915], Shell [Times, 23 June 1915], Barclay Perkins
[Times, 13 July 1915], Workington Iron and Steel [Times, 8 August 1915],
Dorman Long [Times, 13 April 1916], Furness Withy [Times, 31 July 1916 and 26
October 1918], and Elder Dempster [Times, 25 May 1917].
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is too great to secure that victory without which life would be
intolerable” [Times, 9 December 1915]. He slightly spoiled the
effect by noting in the next paragraph that “it is not in the
interests of the country to withdraw large sums from earning
taxable revenue”. Company chairmen had to tread a fine line if
they were to make the case against handing over large amounts
of revenue without appearing to be unpatriotically greedy.
One way of doing this was to agree that they had indeed
made large profits, but that these were not from the war.7
Furness Withy, the shipping company, asserted that their profit
came not from food freight to Britain, but from foreign trade
and luxury goods [Economist, 1917, p. 173]. Another approach
was to admit that one’s company was making profits from the
war, but to point out that other companies were making more
Armstrong Whitworth observed in 1918 that “as patriotic tax-
payers we did not complain, but we cannot help noticing that
other industries have . . . made and distributed profits which
compare very favourably with the results we have been able to
show” [Economist, 1918, p. 375]. John Brown (whose 1915 divi-
dend was 50% higher than its 50-year average) had a two-part
defense: firstly, they had to make hay while the sun shone. Their
Chairman, Lord Aberconway, pointed out in 1915 that after the
war “it might be years before any of the armament firms got an
order”. Besides, it was unfair to pick on them. He pointed to the
Army contractors for “flour, meat, clothing, boots, tinned provi-
sions, jam, fodder . . . etc . . . Why, those firms would be making
far larger relative profits than armament firms, and when the
war was over, far from being cast out into the streets they would
go on making money” [Times, 30 June 1915].
As noted above, a number of researchers have questioned
the extent of profiteering, in view of the risk incurred by certain
companies and the impact of inflation, as well as the efforts that
some made to restrict their profits. Their findings do not deny
that profiteering took place, but encourage the thought that at
least some companies might have supported their defense by
publishing detailed financial reports. This they did not do. Some
did not produce accounts for a number of years on the ground
of confidentiality, for instance Vickers between 1915 and 1918
[Times, 9 October 1918], or delays in settling government ac-
7 See Humber Ltd and Castner-Kellner Alkali Ltd [both Times, 25 November
1915], Harrison and Crosfield [Economist, 1917, pp. 669-671] and Dunlop Rub-
ber Ltd [Economist, 1917, p. 107] for a similar contention.
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counts – Armstrong Whitworth in 1916 and 1917 [Times, 19
September 1918].8
Many others offered the amount of detail – i.e. scanty –
which was required by the 1907 Companies Act. P&O, one of the
shipping companies with hugely increased profits, cut back its
disclosure. It reduced its financial statements from 13 pages pre-
war to nine in 1915, and its profit and loss account was “simpli-
fied to a point at which figures cease to have much significance”
[Economist, 1915, p. 928]. By 1917, the journal was severely
critical: P&O’s profit and loss account information had been
“suppressed” in a way that was “a serious abuse of the confi-
dence of shareholders and . . . a bad example to be set by a
respectable company” [Economist, 1917, p. 912]. Lord Inchcape
told the P&O shareholders he had no intention of “publishing
your private affairs to the world” when rival shipping companies
in neutral countries “who have been coining money during the
war” could steal a march by reading them [Times, 5 December
1915]. The Cairn shipping line simply declined to give any indi-
cation of its profits [Times, 12 September 1918]. Spillers, who
quadrupled their profits in the flour business, made a similar
excuse to P&O’s in 1915 [Times, 3 May 1915]. Whatever strategy
British companies adopted to counter accusations of unfair
trading, they did not intend to go into detail about their results.
They preferred to treat profit and loss data as confidential and
adopt other strategies to ward off press and political criticism.
The other measure adopted by companies in the face of
criticism and intervention was to go on the offensive, and put
forward their own agenda as well as react to that of government
and other commentators. This counter-attack took a number of
forms, and was directed against both taxation and other forms
of government intervention. P&O were not alone in pointing to
the foreign threat. The point was often made that competitors in
Germany or in neutral companies were either taxed at a lower
rate or not at all on profits. EPD would damage the chances of
British firms after the war by leaving them worse off than their
rivals. Shipping companies advanced this argument repeatedly,9
but industrialists also invoked the postwar German menace; the
8 United Alkali Co Ltd was also delayed [Economist, 1917, p. 707], and Curtis
and Henry were unable to produce their 1916 accounts until after their 1917
ones because of similar problems [Times, 26 April 1918].
9 Among them Orient [Times, 22 December 1915 and 30 January 1918], King
Line [Times, 29 March 1916], Mitre [Times, 12 December 1917], Anchor Line
[Economist, 1917, pp. 127-128], and Lamport and Holt [Times, 12 April 1918].
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Chairman of British Westinghouse asserted that “there had been
no more enthusiastic advocates (of the war) than the heads of
the great German industries and financial establishments”
[Economist, 1917, p. 748]. Bradford Dyers [Economist, 1917, pp.
440-444] made similar points. This was closely allied to the ar-
gument that EPD was liable to damage post-war prospects be-
cause it prevented the accumulation of reserves – as claimed for
instance by Pearson and Knowles [Times, 1 October 1915], Spill-
ers and Bakers [Times, 8 May 1916], and RMSP [Times, 7 June
1917]. Implicit in these arguments was the assertion that war-
time profits were not “excess” – they were a fair reward for
productivity and the government should not handicap industry
by appropriating them.
EPD was also invoked in connection with two other chal-
lenging issues – labor relations and government control of busi-
ness – and these are discussed below.
Labor Relations: Companies made frequent reference to the rela-
tionship between employers and workers. This was often posi-
tive; chairmen stressed the excellent attitude of employees and
the good spirit prevailing in the factory. There were also confi-
dent appeals for further co-operation. The Chairman of John
Knight Ltd called for labor and capital to work “hand in hand”
[Times, 23 February 1918], and the Chairman of Crossley Bros
Ltd stressed that “we must all pull together” [Times, 28 February
1918].10 Linked to this was an emphasis on the benefits con-
ferred on the employees. Lord Aberconway pointed out in 1919
that over the last ten years the Tredegar Iron and Coal Company
Ltd had paid £10 million in wages and £700,000 in dividends
[Economist, 1919, p. 64]. In the same year Lord Lever enumer-
ated the welfare provision for Lever Bros employees – housing,
bank accounts, a six-hour working day and so on [Economist,
1919, p. 529]. “Industrial peace” was achieved, on this basis, by
the efforts of management.
But a number of chairmen went on to make a contrast
between the improvement in workers’ conditions and the reduc-
tion in profits caused by EPD – for instance Charles Allen of
Ebbw Vale Steel Iron and Coal remarked that “while opportuni-
ties for making profits are strictly limited, there appears to be
no boundary to that golden, rosy horizon of advancement of
10 See also e.g. Shell [Times, 23 June 1915], Dennis Bros Ltd [Times, 23
November 1915], Thomas Wallis [Times, 28 February 1918], among others.
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wages for the men” [Times, 30 June 1916]. Similar contrasts
were drawn at Bolckow Vaughan [Times, 30 September 1915] –
“of these prices the wage-earners are getting a larger proportion
than they have ever done before”– and by the Tredegar Iron and
Coal Company Ltd [Times, 1 July 1916 and 2 July 1917]. As the
war continued, criticism of labor became more severe, particu-
larly in the coal industry. The Chairman of Pease & Partners
said in 1919 that he did not think that the miners had been
“playing the game since the mines were controlled by the gov-
ernment” [Economist, 1919 p. 1095]. In the same year, the
Chairman of Ebbw Vale lamented that the attitude of labor
“grows worse day by day” and thought that, unless labor leaders
learned “a soberer, clearer and saner view”, Bolshevism would
take industry “down into the nethermost pit” [Economist, 1919,
pp. 152-153]. According to Aberconway at the Sheepbridge
AGM, “a microbe of unrest and extravagance” had infected the
British people [Economist, 1919, p. 511].
Business and Government: Company chairmen, as noted above,
stressed their willingness to co-operate in the national effort, by
paying EPD (despite the problems it created), and promoting
industrial peace (despite the demands made by labor). But they
frequently referred to the difficulties they faced in working with
government – which were attributed to the lack of government
understanding of industry and commerce. Senior businessmen
held many government posts during the war. “The Ministry of
Munitions was from first to last a business-man organisation”
[Lloyd George, quoted by Searle, 1987, p. 275]; more than 90
company directors and managers were employed there. The
cabinet included a swathe of “businessmen-cum-ministers”
[Searle, 1987, p. 276], and, at local level, the District Armaments
Committees overseeing production were primarily made up of
businessmen [Cronin, 1991, p. 68].
Despite this influx the problem was often argued to be the
refusal of the British government to pay attention to the needs
of British industry. The Chairman of the Sheffield steelmakers
Hadfields Ltd pointed out in 1916 that “there was not a single
representative of technical business men in the government”,
whereas “the head of Krupps had for ten years reported every
fortnight to the head of the German Empire as to the progress of
his work at Essen” [Sheffield Daily Independent, 25 March 1916].
The same point was taken up by the Chairman of Workington
Iron and Steel who contrasted the “pampered and petted” status
of Krupps with the treatment of British iron and steel manufac-
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turers. [Times, 2 September 1916]. There was a continuing
strand of criticism of what was called the “hydra-headed system
of bureaucracy” [Chairman of the Salt Union, Economist, 1917,
p. 558] which impeded business efficiency, and of inappropriate
government appointments – e.g. “Lord Rhondda knows all about
coal so he is placed at the head of the Food Control. Sir Eric
Geddes knows all about railways therefore he is placed in com-
mand of naval affairs” [Chairman of Lennards, Economist, 1919,
p. 191]. Dudley Docker, the Chairman of Metropolitan Carriage,
Wagon and Finance appealed in 1916 “For Heaven’s sake, let us
see to it that in matters we do know something about, our in-
dustries, our financial institutions and so forth, we keep the
politicians at a respectful distance” [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p.
109].11
Lord Inchcape of P&O claimed in a letter to the Times [28
December 1918] that “no man of any account in business ever
uttered a word of complaint about government control during
hostilities”. This seems to overlook an increasingly aggressive
strain in the comments made on the government’s control. The
Chairman of Moor Line attacked “pretentious gentlemen who
have no trace of commercial experience” [Times, 2 March 1917]
and Robert Mond of Mond Nickel complained of suffering “im-
mense difficulties . . . by reason of Government restriction”
[Times, 27 September 1918]. As the war continued, and the tax
rate went up, the declared attitude to EPD changed from accep-
tance to savage criticism. In 1918 it was “vicious in the extreme”
[Inchcape, Economist, 1918, p. 814]; by 1919 Lord Lever was
calling it “an assassin’s blow” to industry and shipping [Econo-
mist, 1919, p. 529]. The Chairman of Peek Bros Winch, Ltd, a
food retailer, described businessmen as “toads under the har-
row” of the government, and food controls as “a crime against
the public and especially the poor” [Times, 3 January 1918].
This kind of polemic, like the warnings of labor Bolshevism,
suggests that at least some business leaders were no longer in
the good humour they enjoyed after the 1915 Treasury Confer-
ence. If businesses could not find helpful support from the gov-
ernment, they needed to obtain it elsewhere, and the following
sections of the paper consider some evidence for this search for
support.
Representatives of the Shareholders: Part of the strategy for find-
ing support was the corporate claim to being representative.
11 See below for further details of Docker’s contribution.
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Repeatedly, chairmen stressed that they were looking after the
interests of a large body of shareholders. In 1916, Lord Inchcape
pointed out that P&O had 8,500 shareholders; ships, he said,
were owned “not by a restricted class but by the people gener-
ally” [Economist, 1916, p. 1132]. The Fine Cotton Spinners
Chairman quoted an average shareholding of £300 amongst its
30,000 shareholders; they represented “the hard-earned savings
of really careful people”. Mitre Shipping were “trustees for a
vast body of shareholders” [Economist, 1918, p. 885]. In 1919,
Mitchelson, Chairman of the mining company D. Davis, re-
minded the Sankey Commission that the “so-called coalowners”
were in fact “many thousands of shareholders drawn from the
entire community” [Economist, 1919, p. 452].12 Limited compa-
nies were attempting to distance themselves from an elitist posi-
tion – shareholding was open to “really careful people”, not con-
fined to the wealthy, and the company chairman could therefore
speak to the government (and to refractory workers) in the inter-
ests of a large social group. It was also another means of coun-
tering the charge of profiteering – profits were earned, and divi-
dends paid, for the common good.
Business Solidarity: As well as claims to representativeness,
speeches at AGMs displayed solidarity within business: com-
pany chairmen spoke up in each other’s defense. One aspect of
this has already been discussed – the calls for government to
take more account of business views and refrain from interfer-
ence. Another reflection of solidarity was the expression of sup-
port for an organization founded during the war which became
a major representative of British business, the Federation of
British Industries (FBI), founded in 1916. The FBI was one of a
number of employers’ organizations set up during the war
[Turner, 1984, pp. 39-49]; it had the advantage of being pro-
moted by Dudley Docker, who was a leading businessman in the
Midlands,13 and supported by among others the chairmen of
Vickers, Hadfields and Marconi. Docker used the 1917 AGM of
Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon and Finance Co to stress the im-
portance of the FBI – “the Federation will, and must, attract the
attention of the Government when forming industrial regula-
12 A point he also made at the company’s AGM [Times, 13 March 1919].
13 He was closely involved with Daimler and Birmingham Small Arms
among others. Winston Churchill in 1918 invited his wife to accompany him
to Birmingham to “see tanks and munitions workers . . . & Mr Dudley Docker”
[Davenport-Hines, 1984, p. 93].
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tion” [Times, 8 June 1917]. Similar themes were addressed at
the AGMs of Birmingham Small Arms [Times, 10 August 1918],
and Kynoch [Times, 18 October 1918]. Lord Inchcape told a
businessmen’s conference that “the mercantile community”
must “show a strong front” to prevent the government from
nationalizing “everything for all time” [Times, 10 May 1918].
Middlemas comments [1979, p. 112] that employers had “a
growing awareness of the need to increase their political power
in the second half of the war”. Certainly the formation of the
FBI appears to have been a political move. The FBI’s attitude to
the trades union movement “shifted from tentative co-operation
to active aggression during 1917 and 1918” [Turner, 1984, p.
47], a transition that is echoed in the changing tone of AGM
commentaries on labor relations. At the end of the war, the
Conservative ministers of the Coalition government “could be
heard consulting with the FBI on how to present more tactfully
the bitter question of profiteering” [Middlemas, 1979, p. 131].
By 1919, the FBI was involved in setting up “an organisation for
Anti-Bolshevik propaganda” which in 1920 was relaunched as
National Propaganda, with a budget of £250,000 [Davenport-
Hines, 1984, p. 130]. It pursued a course of attacking trade
union militancy and the threat of nationalization, under
the chairmanship of Lord Inchcape [Turner, 1984, p. 47;
Middlemas, 1979, p. 132].
The attitudes and agenda of the FBI incorporated many of
the issues raised in wartime and summarized above. The sup-
port it received14 suggests that these issues were matters of gen-
eral concern for businessmen, rather than the preoccupation of
a small number of politically active company chairmen, an issue
which will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
Shareholders and the AGM: Before moving on to a discussion of
these findings, it is relevant to say something about the other
element of the AGM, which was the contribution made by share-
holders. This was often limited, because shareholders’ contribu-
tion to AGMs was normally to vote unanimously in favor of the
acceptance of the accounts. There were occasionally shareholder
objections; for instance Lipton’s results in 1915, which were very
poor, were the subject of lengthy discussion. The Vickers ac-
counts of 1915, which were delayed by wartime conditions, gave
rise to a few questions about poorly-performing bonds and
14 80 companies had joined the FBI within a month of its formation, rising
to over 400 within a year [Davenport-Hines, 1984, p. 114].
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about directors’ commission, but also to congratulations from a
satisfied shareholder [Times, 28 April 1915]. At the 1918 meeting
of Dennis Bros Ltd [Times, 2 December 1918] there were a num-
ber of comments from a shareholder, but all were complimen-
tary about the company’s conservative accounting policies and
the moderation of directors’ salaries. In the same year, at the
Dublin Steam Packet Co meeting, shareholders asked questions
which were effectively compliments – “we have listened with
great pleasure to the interesting account you have given us”
[Times, 20 November 1918].
The AGM did not operate as a forum for discussion or pub-
lic criticism of directors’ achievements: what the directors said
was a performance that was more or less entirely planned in
advance as an expression of what they considered important.
The coverage of issues such as labor relations and profiteering
was not, therefore, a response to demand from shareholders; the
audience being addressed included not only those present but
also those who would subsequently read newspaper or journal
reports of the AGM.
DISCUSSION
The preceding section of the paper has identified a number
of issues which were frequently addressed at AGMs during and
immediately after the Great War. These concerned the relation-
ship between limited companies and the government, their em-
ployees, their foreign competitors, their shareholders and the
public at large. Some of the discussions of these issues (in par-
ticular to do with the treatment of their employees on active
service or in the workplace) were quantified; others were state-
ments of principle. The tone varied from expressions of support
and solidarity to severe criticism (of government and of employ-
ees), and comments became increasingly negative towards the
end of the war. Examples were found in many industrial and
service sectors, with some concentration by particular sectors
on particular topics; EPD was markedly prominent in the ship-
ping industry and labor relations in coalmining companies.
There was also considerable overlap between the themes ad-
dressed by company chairmen and those taken up by the FBI on
behalf of British industry in general. This section of the paper
will consider the relationship between these findings and corpo-
rate social reporting as it is practiced, and discuss their contri-
bution to current research on the factors encouraging compa-
nies to make social disclosures.
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The History of Corporate Social Reporting: Sethi wrote [1995, p.
18] “The notion of corporate social responsibility . . . came into
vogue almost 25 years ago [and] it almost simultaneously be-
came an issue of general public concern. Its notoriety coincided
with the rise of social activism in the United States”. His state-
ment represents an important element of much academic com-
mentary on corporate social responsibility (CSR) – the belief
that CSR came into being late in the 20th century, and that its
adoption by companies was intrinsically linked with the devel-
opment of changed social expectations about the performance
of industry. The birth of CSR is often associated with the in-
creasing importance of the stakeholder concept in corporate
governance – the identification of groups whose interests the
“business corporation can and should serve” [Preston and
Sapienza, 1990 p. 361]. Their paper identifies the use of the
concept in business and academic writing as early as 1943, and
its “formal introduction” into management writing is placed in
1958, when Dill identified the four major sectors of the “task
environment” as customers, suppliers, competitors and regula-
tory groups. [Preston and Sapienza, 1990, pp. 361-362]. The
term, as opposed to the concept, was apparently first introduced
in 1963 at the Stanford Research Institute, “to generalize the
notion of stockholder as the only group to whom management
need be responsive” [Sternberg, quoting Freeman, 1997, p. 3].
The notion that CSR developed in the wake of the stake-
holder concept, coupled with new social demands on business
that developed in and after the 1960s, underpins much contem-
porary writing about CSR. It is notable that many surveys en-
dorse Sethi by covering the last 30-40 years of the 20th century
as comprising the history of CSR For instance, Tinker et al be-
gin their review [1991] in the mid-1960s,15 and Mathews [1997]
traces the study of CSR from 1970 onwards.16 Gray [2002], in a
recent review of the academic literature from the mid-1970s
onwards, describes social accounting as “typically thought of as
an activity (and a possibility) of emerging interest from about
the mid- to late 1960s”.
Gray qualifies this characterization by admitting that social
accounting can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th
century, and indeed that “it seems inevitable that the wider one
15 Though they admit [1991, p. 31] that the critique of accounting may have
had earlier roots.
16 Similar comments are made by, for instance, Post and Andrews [in
Preston, 1982, p. 1]; Patten [1992, p. 471] and Roberts [1992, p. 596].
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draws the definition of social accounting, the wider the accounts
it incorporates and the more ubiquitous and the deeper-rooted
in history it becomes” [Gray, 2002]. He concedes that “there is
much work to be done by social accountants on such issues”
[ibid.]. There have been studies which look at CSR before the
1960s – e.g. Hogner [1982], Guthrie and Parker [1989], Adams
and Harte [1998], and Unerman, [2000] – but the possibility that
some form of CSR was being practiced before the 1960s has
generally attracted little attention. Deegan, for instance, in an
overview of “some of the research questions that can be pur-
sued” in social and environmental reporting, identifies 13 actual
or potential research areas - investigation of the historical devel-
opment of CSR does not figure among them [Deegan, 2002, pp.
286-288].
History and an Understanding of CSR: The belief that “the devel-
opment of social and environmental accounting and account-
ability practices is still in its infancy (for example, compared to
the long historical practice of financial reporting)” [Deegan,
2002] is understandably widespread, given the focus of most
academic studies. The present paper argues, however, that AGM
disclosures 1914-1919 are part of the early history of CSR, and
that this history has implications for a contemporary under-
standing of the practice.
There are a number of possible objections to this conten-
tion, related to the form and the content of the AGM reports. In
relation to form, it is the case that the subject-matter of this
paper has been taken from newspaper and journal reports of
AGMs, whereas present-day CSR is directly produced by compa-
nies – via annual reports, separate CSR documentation etc. Are
the CSR elements of wartime reports deliberately planned dis-
closures or simply those parts of AGM speeches that were se-
lected by journalists as being particularly controversial? There
are a number of reasons for rejecting the latter suggestion.
When different publications report the same AGM very similar
content appears, suggesting that reports were transcripts, rather
than edited and angled versions of what was said. (The reports
printed in The Economist were paid for by the relevant firm,
which makes it unlikely that the journal exercised editorial con-
trol over their content).17 The absence of CSR material from the
17 For instance there are close resemblances between the reports of
Armstrong Whitworth in The Economist [1918, pp. 374-377] and in The Times
[19 September 1918], and between those of Boots in The Economist [1919, pp.
80-81] and in The Times [16 January 1919].
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newspaper reports of a substantial number of AGMs is also evi-
dence that published reports were not edited highlights of meet-
ings. It appears that political, social and economic elements
were reported when they occurred; speeches that were simply a
commentary on financial results and prospects were recorded as
such.
In relation to content, the statements made by senior busi-
nessmen fall largely into the category of CSR disclosure de-
scribed by Gray et al [1995, p. 86] as “declarative” – their mod-
ern counterparts are categorized as “mission statements,
statements of social responsibility and political statements”
[Gray et al, 1995, p. 89]. There are some quantitative and mon-
etary elements – e.g. the number of staff who had joined the
forces, the amounts of tax/wages/benefits paid in the public in-
terest – but the majority of the disclosures are narrative state-
ments or political/economic arguments. The preponderance of
qualitative material marks a difference from contemporary prac-
tice, and from contemporary attempts to find new methods of
accounting for/quantifying activities, but the qualitative material
is still a form of disclosure.
The objection might also be made that the disclosures made
are simply self-expression by businessmen with strong political
views, and that the content of the present paper is therefore
anecdotal, rather than evidence of a general tendency amongst
British businesses. The evidence offered can be supported in a
number of ways. One aspect that deserves attention is the wide
spread of companies making CSR disclosures. As noted above,
companies in certain sectors placed particular stress on certain
disclosures (shipping and EPD, mining and labor relations), but
examples of such disclosures can be found among a wide spec-
trum of industries and trades – including armaments, iron and
steel, food, textiles, chemicals, petroleum and rubber.
The topics that are covered, as noted earlier, fall into a
limited number of categories, suggesting that there were certain
concerns – about profits and taxation, labor relations, and gov-
ernment intervention – that preoccupied many businesses. The
timing of disclosures also coincides – manpower contribution
was a topic for the early part of the war; comments on EPD and
labor relations became less positive as time wore on, again sug-
gesting a shared point of view. Finally, the extent to which the
FBI acted as a proponent of similar arguments suggests that
these were shared by many businessmen who were ready to
support an organization that would speak on their behalf.
The findings summarized in this paper are of interest for a
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number of reasons. They offer an insight into the publicly-ex-
pressed views of senior businessmen in a period where these
were not widely recorded,18 and they contribute towards an un-
derstanding of the history of CSR, which, as Gray [2002] points
out, deserves further exploration. 1914-1919 was a period in
which businesses were collectively exposed to a number of simi-
lar challenges. It was a stimulus for them to respond vehemently
with a repertoire of similar arguments that are a striking case-
study in CSR. This is not to suggest, however, that CSR was a
product of the First World War in Britain which then went into
abeyance until the 1970s. Maltby [2004] gives an overview of
similar reporting strategies by a number of large manufacturing
firms over the first three decades of the 20th century: there,
again, different companies appear to have identified similar is-
sues and applied similar arguments in countering them. As
noted above, there have been a number of previous studies
which look at CSR prior to the 1970s, but there is still a need to
establish how widely CSR was practiced during – and indeed
before – the 20th century, what social and political challenges
appear to have prompted it and what arguments were adopted
by companies in putting their case.
Why did company chairmen publicly express strong views
on issues of taxation, labor relations and government control
during the Great War? Contemporary writing about CSR offers
a number of competing explanations for the activity, which may
also be applied to the findings of the present paper. From the
company’s viewpoint, CSR may be seen as an attempt to com-
municate with an audience of stakeholders, inside and outside
the firm. Certainly the examples offered above display
management’s desire to demonstrate patriotism, and to impress
shareholders with their concern to promote profitability as far
as was consistent with serving the national interest, but it is
questionable how far management was communicating with
workers as stakeholders. At some points, the management style
was to treat the workforce as part of a team – at others, manage-
ment was accusing workers of an unrealistic or a deliberately
destructive attitude. Similarly, Maltby [2004, p. 431] quotes the
managing director of Hadfields as treating working men as “col-
leagues” in a 1907 speech; in 1920, he inveighed against the
danger of “red ruin” caused by their strikes. Workers appear to
18 Boswell and Johns, [1982, p. 425] note the potential usefulness of com-
pany chairmen’s speeches as a record of business attitudes.
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have been treated as stakeholders only as long as they were co-
operative.
Legitimacy theory suggests that companies report in order
to demonstrate their adherence to social norms and expecta-
tions – they are reacting to external pressures [see for instance
Deegan, 2002, pp. 282-311]. Political economy theory on the
other hand regards CSR as proactive, “information provided
from management’s perspective designed to set and shape the
agenda of debate” [Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 351].19 Cer-
tainly, wartime reports attempted to demonstrate patriotism
and selflessness – companies’ contribution to the war effort via
tax, manpower and charitable donations. To this extent, they
were legitimizing themselves by allying themselves with the na-
tional spirit. But the vehemence with which many businessmen
defended their position arguably goes beyond legitimating.
Their attacks on government incompetence and trades union
Bolshevism suggest that the disclosures made at AGMs were
indeed an attempt to set, rather than observe, the agenda and to
“show a strong front” to a potentially hostile public. In the same
way, armaments manufacturers in the 1930s made the case that
they were not self-interested warmongers but essential to na-
tional security [Maltby, 2004, pp. 433-434].
The AGM provided companies with an opportunity to ad-
vance “the business case” [Owen et al, 2001] using a medium
that would enable them to communicate not only with share-
holders but with the newspaper-reading public in general. As the
environment changed – in wartime with the increasing level of
EPD and growing problems in labor relations – the tone of AGM
speeches became increasingly aggressive. Companies went be-
yond aligning themselves with national interests: they were
making the case for their own values – for what Sir Robert
Hadfield later called their “necessary and honourable service to
the nation” [Maltby, 2004, p. 433]. This was achieved not only
by recounting their own achievements but attacking those who
criticized them or limited their freedom of action. Limited com-
panies were not merely supporters of patriotic values; they pre-
sented themselves as embodying those values. When the Chair-
man of John Brown claimed that his company “were never
encouraged by the government to do more than they had done;
on the contrary they found themselves in advance of the govern-
19 This is the interpretation placed by Unerman on the disclosures made by
Shell 1950-1965, which commented on government behaviour and taxation as it
affected the petrol industry.
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ment demands” [Economist, 1915, pp. 22-23] he was doing more
than legitimizing his company – he was presenting it as part of
the vanguard of national security.
Recognition that CSR is not the product of a new ethos, but
rather a continuing response to social and political challenges,
offers scope for further exploration of the motives behind its
adoption and the themes which management chooses to ad-
dress. An investigation of the history of CSR has much to con-
tribute not only to the discussion of modern CSR but to an
understanding of the relationship between business and society.
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